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A B S T R A C T
This paper offers a reading of anti-austerity protests in the Irish Republic, placing under scrutiny in particular the
origins, meaning, and implications of the country's water wars. It notes the proclivity of some post-crash anti-
austerity populisms to fall prey to a politics of retrenchment and exclusion and even to degenerate into na-
tionalist spasms or what Jean Paul Sartre would term fraternity terrorisms. It contributes conceptual novelty to
existing human geographical scholarship on protest movements by convening Jean Paul Sartre and Judith Butler
in conversation; registering therein the political potential of the fused group, performing popular sovereignty
through public assembly. What makes the Irish case fascinating and worthy of scrutiny is the fact that protest
never ossified and totalised into an oppressive or regressive form of political populism. Our central argument is
that Ireland's water protest movement was effective because it was constituted from outside mainstream politics;
from molecular and atomised struggles which scaled and agglomerated into large public assemblies which,
whilst ultimately inchoate and indeterminate, signified that popular sovereignty had usurped the centre-right
representative regime and challenged the latter's right to custody over democracy.
1. Introduction
Globalisation, neoliberalism, the global financial crash and austerity
have combined to effect a growing dislocation between representative
democracy and popular sovereignty. Throughout the advanced capi-
talist world, there have arisen new Right and Left populisms, and
consequential ‘earthquake’ elections and referenda, which have
shocked the body politic. Sage court judges that we now live in the age
of the ‘left behinds’. Counter-posed to the globalists and hypermobile
‘anywheres’, the left behinds constitute the ‘somewheres’, marked by a
particular class, education and age profile, anchored in places now
rendered redundant by global capital, and abandoned it seems to
managed decline and terminal marginality. Populism has mushroomed
in communities long overlooked, indeed, sometimes even scorned, by
the establishment elite and their representative governments. In a Cri de
Coeur, caustic voices declare that the political swamp must be drained
and the will of the people restored.
Human geographical scholarship on social movements and protests
(Routledge, 2003, 2015; Featherstone, 2012; Halvorsen, 2017; Miller,
2016; Nicholls, 2009) has sought to understand the historical and
geographical circumstances in which popular protest arises; the
spatiality of protest, its causes and consequences, and; the uneven ef-
ficacy of protest. These foci speak intimately to the variegated geo-
graphies of political populism currently fermenting in post-crash aus-
terity states, particularly in Europe’s periphery. Whilst the Right has
shown itself to be particularly adept at claiming the politics of the left
behinds (witness Trump, Brexit, Hofer, Wilders, Kurz, Orban and Le
Pen), Left populisms too have entered the fray (for example Syriza,
Podemos, Costa, Sanderson, Corbyn) (Arampatzi, 2017; Davies and
Blanco, 2017; Della Porta, 2015; Featherstone, 2012; Gerbaudo, 2017;
Nolan and Featherstone, 2015). And so an urgent research agenda
presents itself: what are the progenitors of current populisms and which
factors determine whether populisms pivot to the Right or to the Left?
Do Right and Left populisms exhibit similar or varying spatialities; if so
why and with what consequence? Which populisms are most able to
impact and recalibrate the political landscape and why?
This paper places under scrutiny the aetiology, spatiality and effi-
cacy of anti-austerity protests in the Irish Republic, a country with a
particularly intense encounter with globalisation, neoliberalism, boom
and bust, and savage austerity. Specifically, it offers a reading of the
origins, meaning, and implications of the Irish water wars. Ireland is
often presented as an exemplar of the virtues of austerity without
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hysteria. Our account challenges the much-propagated myth that not-
withstanding years of trenchant, painful austerity, anti-austerity pro-
tests have been invisible, ineffectual, and inconsequential. Whilst it is
true that the mainstream centre-right representative regime and the
established Left (the Labour and Green parties, trade unions, NGOs,
charities) offered no meaningful resistance to austerity – indeed were
meaningfully complicit in its enforcement – often glossed over in this
narrative is that austerity birthed a new generation of civil society,
grassroots, place-based activist groups and protest movements. The
Irish waters war in particular crashed onto the political scene from
2014, rudely interrupting the hegemonic narrative that the country’s
austerity programme had been passively if grudgingly accepted by a
‘sober’ and ‘responsible’ Irish people, who had in turn been rewarded
with an impressive ‘Celtic Comeback’.
We develop our argument in three sections. First, we bring con-
ceptual novelty to existing human geographical scholarship on social
movements and post-crash anti-austerity populisms by convening Jean
Paul Sartre and Judith Butler in conversation and registering the poli-
tical potential of the fused group, performing popular sovereignty
through public assembly. Second, we introduce Ireland’s austerity
programme confronting the prevailing myth that the Irish population
accepted austerity without popular resistance. Third, with the support
of new survey, interview, and participant engagement data and a series
of empirical vignettes, we attempt to render intelligible the Irish water
wars. Our central thesis is that when set into international relief
Ireland’s anti-austerity protests were distinctive insofar as their genesis
lay in everyday encounters with austerity and atomised and molecular
struggles, which scaled, agglomerated, and gathered momentum to
become a historical force. In Ireland, a vigorous and dynamic group in
fusion took to the streets and at least for a critical period, popular so-
vereignty usurped representative politics and challenged its custody of
democracy.
2. Sartre, Butler and the intelligibility of the risen people
The thought of Jean Paul Sartre weighs heavily in the scholarship of
Judith Butler, yet the project of interrogating the intellectual com-
plementarities and dissonances between them remains in its infancy.
We attempt the more modest task of bringing into conversation Sartre’s
Critique of Dialectical Reason and Butler’s Notes Toward a Performative
Theory of Assembly, in the belief that in these volumes Sartre and Butler
yield critical insights into moments when representative democracy and
popular sovereignty dislocate, beginning with molecular struggles
rooted in privations encountered in everyday life, not least in times of
austerity. These insights inform a theory of social movement, placing
front and centre the swarming and coalescing of atomised protests into
a consequential political force. We focus particularly upon the nexus of
scarcity, alienation, and anarchic protest in the Critique, and precarity,
public assembly, and popular sovereignty in Notes.
The theme of human freedom in situation connects Sartre’s philo-
sophical, literary, and political writings, and his activism (Sartre,
1943). But he understood and realized this project in different ways as
he drifted famously from existentialism (especially Being and Nothing-
ness, 1943 to existential Marxism (rising to a crescendo with his 1960
Critique of Dialectical Reason) and finally to a semi-messianic anarchism
of sorts (in his controversial interviews with Benny Levy just before his
death published in 1980 as Hope Now) (Sartre and Levy, 1995). Sartre
came to recognize the weight of historical and social processes in
alienating human beings and delimiting the situations where they can
act freely and authentically. Steadily, he became aware of the need for
collective action and group praxis in support of human liberation be-
coming at some stage a dogmatic Marxist. Always, however, he re-
mained suspicious of ‘fraternity terrorism’ or the ossification of lib-
eration movements themselves into crippling and oppressive
bureaucracies.
In the Critique, Sartre set himself the task of rescuing Marxism from
its degradation at the hands of Bolsheviks and under the tyrannical
reign of Stalin, a revolutionary strand he construed as a historical
perversion. Rejecting deterministic historical teleology, he sought to
write an anthropology of the authentic Marxist movements which
would overturn capitalism and colonialism. Existentialism was posi-
tioned now as a parasitical and subordinate philosophy with value only
insofar as it could serve a new western Marxist tradition. Sartre was
determined to establish the basis for totalisation without a totaliser. But
his tortuous linguistic repertoire and schematic formulations (articu-
lated with infuriating fluency) failed to unlock the secrets of history.
Instead of totalisation, Sartre could see only a restless and circular
dialectic. He aborted his project, leaving only incomplete manuscripts.
But what he concluded as a failed intellectual project has turned out to
be a work of great originality and relevance (Boyle, 2005; Boyle and
Kobayashi, 2011, 2015; Kobayashi and Boyle, 2014).
Sartre set out what he termed a theory of practical ensembles
(Sartre, 1976). In many ways this theory hinges on his notoriously
pessimistic proclivity to construe interpersonal relations as essentially
predatory and violent. Encountering the facticity of the world, I allow
myself to fall prey to the ‘look’ of others, serve as a being for others,
lapse into bad faith and default to inauthentic modes of being. Un-
packing this facticity, and notwithstanding his Marxism, he turns to
scarcity as a pivotal concept: tracking a path through Marx, Malthus,
and Smith, scarcity becomes the core progenitor of history. Occasion-
ally, he appears to imply that scarcity is a species condition and has
ontological status; all human history is mediated by struggle against
absolute scarcity. But of course he recognises that scarcity is historically
produced and relative; societies figure distributive mechanisms to al-
locate resources, creating contingent scarcities, or what Sartre refers to
as milieu of scarcity. Human relations remain essentially predatory and
violent but now we understand why: crudely put, others constitute a
threat to my capacity to access limited resources and even to my sur-
vival; more subtly, a Hobbesian bellicosity perpetually sabotages soci-
ality.
For Sartre, in any milieu of contingent scarcity there exists a dia-
lectic between passivity and protest. In the passive moment the weight
of scarcity generates mistrust, suspicion, atomisation, a plurality of
solitudes. Scarcity overwhelms sociality. A group exists, but only in a
practico-inert state as its members line up in series to accept their ra-
tioned resources. Defaulting to type by using a seemingly banal ex-
ample to make a profound point, Sartre cites the group dynamic in-
herent in a large crowd of people queuing to board a busy bus, perhaps
on a wet winter morning, to capture the dehumanising effects of scar-
city and its insidious undercutting of interpersonal collegiality. In the
protest moment, there emerges a realisation, however fleeting, that
solidarity, mutuality, and reciprocity present best hopes for survival. To
escape seriality, individual projects conjoin into a ‘group in fusion’
filled with a sense of empowerment and hope. Vulnerability is con-
verted to agency, and sociality overwhelms scarcity. Citing the street
marches which coalesced to end with the storming of the Bastille, Sartre
reveals the social and spatial imaginary underpinning his under-
standing of group fusion in action.
Sartre sought to understand how fused groups might totalise to
create revolutionary movements with historical purpose. He invoked
the concept of the third party, to account for the ways in which a ‘third’
serves as a point of confluence for two tributaries of protest, uniting and
re-routing them into a larger watercourse. As thirds pile upon thirds, a
wider alluvial fan of opposition gives way to a single powerful river of
protest. Third parties work only when they frame their own projects as
congruent with projects being pursued by others and synthesise this
multiplicity into a derivative, but entirely novel, historical current.
Because the process is empirical and perpetually emergent, one can
never tell in which direction and to what ends protest may lead. On this
basis, Sartre found himself unable to conclude that history had a pur-
pose and was forced to concede there could be only totalising (a pro-
cess) and never totalisation (an end).
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Whilst investing in the emancipatory potential of the group-in-fu-
sion, Sartre was acutely aware of its fragility. Scarcity weighs on hu-
mans so that they constantly undercut moments of solidarity and often
progressive liberation movements abort, petrify, or dissolve without a
lasting legacy. But grappling always with the shadow of Stalin, Sartre
found himself ironically more suspicious of the growth and structuring
of those fused groups which did survive and prosper. In spite of himself,
he became consumed with the bourgeoisie claim that all revolution is
ordained to end in totalitarianism. To sustain themselves, fraternities
need to institutionalise, but by institutionalising they risk establishing
new types of oppression. Without assuming any particular sequence,
Sartre imagined groups-in-fusion fossilising, ossifying, into fraternities,
statutory groups, organisations, institutions, and social classes: in a
circular dialectic as one oppressive socio-political formation was over-
turned only to be replaced, after a brief period of agency and empow-
erment, with a different but equally oppressive alternative.
The Critique remained unfinished and Volume II only partially
written (Sartre, 1991). Sartre appeared to concede that only small no-
madic guerrilla groups waging endless attacks against hegemonic seri-
alities offered hope. This conclusion has long frustrated scholar-activists
who have sought guidance and inspiration to find that only perpetual
struggle to be a laudable end in itself; hope that a better destination
might be reached was futile and dangerous.
Whilst scarcity does not figure prominently in the work of Judith
Butler, the cognate concept of precarity certainly does (Butler, 2004,
2009; Butler and Athanasiou, 2013). Precarity ‘designates that politi-
cally induced condition in which certain populations suffer from failing
social and economic networks of support more than others and become
differentially exposed to injury, violence, and death. Precarity is thus
the differential distribution of precariousness’ (Butler, 2015: 33). In
neoliberal times, precarity has become a defining feature of human
existence but burdens disproportionately vulnerable social groups (by
spatial location, class, age, gender, sexuality, disability, etc). But it is
also a critical condition that enables a disparate variety of subjugated
peoples to galvanise into a coherent protest movement. The quest for
liveable (more-than-bearable) lives is the common claim of these
groups. The essential political project is to maximise human flourishing
by creating social conditions which sustain viable lives in conditions of
endemic precariousness.
In Notes, Butler (2015) considers the complex relationship between
democratic regimes and public assemblies (gatherings, demonstrations,
protests, occupations, marches). Insofar as they are capable of making a
claim to represent the will of the people, public assemblies can present
as an existential threat to representative regimes; illogically, con-
sistency of logic mandates democratic societies to protect freedom of
assembly, even if it results in revolution and their own demise. But of
course they rarely do. A juridical apparatus has emerged to monitor – in
reality to constitute – the boundary between civil disobedience and
public disorder, the latter often used as grounds to limit the former. But
when states lose control of their capacity to classify, regulate, and po-
lice civil disobedience, they also lose their ability to control the nar-
rative of popular sovereignty and to sustain their claim to be the le-
gitimate guardian of democracy.
Butler enunciates the qualities of public assemblies in times of
precarity, interrogating the capacity of public assemblies to make the
verbal and written claim – or ‘discursive wager’ – that they express the
will of the people. These declarations inevitably are spurious; no one
can confidently speak on behalf of the people as the very notion ‘the
people’ is conceptually dependent upon specific inclusions and exclu-
sions. The pre-discursive iconographies of public gatherings forge this
claim more effectively anyways. Assemblies are plural performativities.
Public assemblies ‘signify in excess of any particular written or voca-
lised account of what they are about’ (Butler, 2015: 8) and ‘the enact-
ment of the people exceeds its representation’ (Butler, 2015: 163). What
plural performativities signify depends upon context and thus varies
over time and space. But Butler references the particular and virulent
symbolism of public assembly in this age of neoliberal governmentality.
Against the figure of the sovereign, resilient, and entrepreneurial sub-
ject, fit for and thriving in a precarious world, corporeal and all-too-
fragile bodies huddling together in support of each other provide a
disruptive reminder that we are a social species, co-dependent, and
capable of leading liveable lives only by prioritising mutual care, social
solidarity, and reciprocity.
Here Butler provides resources to advance the political potential of
the Sartrean group-in-fusion. Insofar as the fused group totalises in and
through public assembly – the storming of the Bastille – it is invested
with power to signify itself as a manifestation of popular sovereignty. In
this era of neoliberal redux, the fused group does more than simply
struggle. Its very existence constitutes an existential threat to re-
presentative democracy, calling into question the claim that re-
presentative politics is popular sovereignty. Perhaps the deepest sig-
nificance of the group in fusion then is that, through its spatiality, it
gains potential to perform popular sovereignty and thereby to discipline
representative regimes that take liberties with democracy.
3. Ireland: Bearing austerity with sober stoicism?
A frontline casualty of the global financial crash, as the Celtic Tiger
economy faltered and against the backdrop of an epic domestic fi-
nancial and property crisis, beginning in 2008 Irish governments im-
plemented a series of gargantuan bank bailouts and savage austerity
budgets (O’Riain, 2014; O'Callaghan et al., 2015). At the behest of the
EC, the Irish state guaranteed the liabilities of the country’s six largest
banks (estimated at €365 billion) and provided a further €64 billion to
recapitalise these banks and to service obligations to (some unsecured)
bondholders. NAMA, the government’s newly formed bad bank,
mopped up the banks’ toxic debts, acquiring loans with an original
value of €77 billion for a reduced (but still inflated) price of over €32
billion. Saddled with an ailing economy, unmanageable bank guaran-
tees, an alarming debt-to-GDP ratio, and a significant budget deficit, the
Irish state found it difficult to borrow on international markets and
turned to the Troika (EC/ECB/IMF) for a bailout package for itself
(from 2010 to 2013) of up to €78 billion. Monitored by the Troika’s
External Programme Compliance Unit (EPCU), these loans came with
conditions and structural adjustments that deepened Ireland’s domestic
austerity regime. In fact, from 2008 to 2015, the Irish Parliament
passed eight austerity budgets involving cumulative cuts to public
spending and social welfare of €20.5 billion and tax increases of €11.5
billion, amounting to almost 20% of the country’s GDP.
It is accurate to say this recovery package was imposed on the Irish
state by the Troika. But the Irish state was not a hapless bystander, as
the mainstream Irish representative regime firmly also pinned its hopes
for recovery on austerity and neoliberalism redux: Celtic Tiger 2.0
(Coulter and Nagle, 2015; Boyle and Wood, 2017). Only by becoming
an even more liberalised, entrepreneurial, and competitive entrepôt for
global capital would Ireland again prosper. Even the established Left
appeared to concede that there was no alternative to Ireland’s gloca-
lised development model; the Labour and Green parties actively sup-
ported the implementation of austerity measures and Irish Trade Un-
ions (including large unions such as IMPACT, SIPTU, and ICTU), NGOs,
and charities opted not to oppose such measures significantly.
Ireland has been held up by the Troika as a poster child of the
virtues of bailout and austerity-led recovery. The ‘Celtic comeback’ has
been celebrated with heightened and at times indecent glee (Roche
et al., 2017). Certainly, encouraging data can be referenced. The
economy grew by 4.5% in 2014, 6.2% in 2015, 5.2% in 2016, 4.7% in
2017, and further growth of 4.2% is expected for 2018; the un-
employment rate, 15.1% in 2010, is projected to be 6.4% in 2017 and
stands at 5.8% today (September 2018); the Government’s Debt/GDP
ratio is on a downward trajectory (forecast to be 68% for 2018); and
Ireland’s current account is on course towards a balanced 2018 budget.
Having swallowed its neoliberal medicine, it is proffered, Ireland is
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firmly on the march again. Other recalcitrant and bankrupt EU coun-
tries would do well to take note of the Irish recipe for success.
But a number of critical questions remain unanswered. Austerity
works according to what metrics? For whom? At what cost? Recovery
because of what? (Kinsella, 2012; Kitchin et al., 2012; McCabe, 2013;
Kearns et al., 2014; Mercille and Murphy, 2015; O’Connor and
Staunton, 2015; Regan, 2016). As the welfare of bondholders, bankers,
developers, and international investors was being attended to, austerity
was inflicting significant pain on Irish citizens, particularly lower in-
come and vulnerable groups (especially unemployed, lone parents,
children). Austerity measures included an income levy and increases in
income taxes, reductions in public sector pay, a VAT increase, reduc-
tions in health care entitlements, social welfare cuts, cuts to state
funding for community services in disadvantaged areas, a massive re-
trenchment in capital infrastructure investment (in particular, social
housing), third-level fee increases, a new household charge (flat prop-
erty tax), privatisation of state assets, and the introduction of domestic
water charges. It is hardly surprising that there has been a marked spike
in mortgage arrears and defaults, homelessness, youth unemployment,
emigration, and suicide (Hearne, 2015).
Given the heavy toll exacted by the Troika partnership recovery
model, the complicity of representative government, and the absence of
established Left oppositional voices, the apparent invisibility of popular
protest in Ireland has been the subject of considerable international and
domestic puzzlement (O’Callaghan et al., 2014; O’Connor, 2017;
O'Callaghan et al., 2015). Austerity has unfolded it is supposed without
provoking a significant push back let alone a political rupture. Although
a gross over-simplification, some commentators have speculated upon
the historical importance of the Catholic Church and the lingering
persistence of cultural conservatism, stoicism, and penance. The Irish
people, it is said, ‘partied too hard’ during the hedonistic days of the
Celtic Tiger. Interior guilt was now creating a willing audience for
messages of sobriety and prudence. The Irish were deemed to have
expressed their anger in the 2011 general election with the collapse of
the centre-right Fianna Fáil party, and the election of Ireland’s other
centre-right party, Fine Gael, in a coalition with the third largest party,
the centre-left Labour Party. Substituting one centre-right party for
another was the extent of the retribution sought by the Irish electorate.
The former Minister for Finance, Brian Lenihan, commented in April
2009 that other European countries were ‘amazed’ at the Irish bud-
getary adjustments and that there would be ‘riots’ if these adjustments
were visited upon other countries. Rewarded for ‘responsible crisis
management’ with an appearance on the cover of Time Magazine in
October 2012, Irish Taoiseach, Enda Kenny, boasted that there had
been no large-scale demonstrations in Ireland because ‘[Irish] people
understand that you have to do difficult things to sort out our own
public finances’. Ireland has been described as an ‘extraordinarily
moderate and passive society’ comprising a ‘passive’ and ‘demobilised’
citizenry. Its response to austerity has been ‘not much more than a long
collective whinge’. Contrasting the actions of Irish workers and citizens
with those in Iceland, Portugal, the UK, Italy, Spain, and Greece, Fraser
et al. (2013: 41) conclude ‘Ireland sticks out because its bailout and the
associated austerity has not been met with significant sustained re-
sistance from trade unions and civil society…. It is almost as if the
general populace has given their passive consent to austerity’.
But what is often ignored in the story of Irish acquiescence is that in
the absence of leadership from within representative government and
from the established Left, community activists, grass-roots advocacy
groups, small trade unions, and more radical political parties, have
given birth to an anti-austerity politics organised largely outside of the
mainstream political regime and, especially at a local level, based on
everyday encounters with privation and precarity (Hearne, 2014).
In a plethora of disparate demonstrations, tens of thousands of
pensioners, students, and community organisations protested welfare
cuts and fee increases in 2008 and 2009. Small Irish ‘Occupy’ protests
were held in 2011, while the Dublin Council of Trade Unions organized
a number of anti-austerity protests. Disadvantaged inner city commu-
nities under attack from devastating cuts to community development
funding animated the protests with symbolic artistic creations such as
the ‘Austerity Kills’ street theatre, which operated under the banner of
‘the Spectacle of Defiance’. The anti-bank debt ‘Ballyhea Says No to
Bondholder Bailout’ weekly protests, started in 2011 in a small rural
town in County Cork and subsequently inspired other ‘Says No’ groups
across the country. Local hospital action groups, disability groups,
youth groups (e.g. ‘We’re Not Leaving’), lone parent families, parents
and teachers contested reductions in special needs assistants, and en-
vironmentalists resisted plans to privatise national forests. December
2011 saw the ‘Campaign against the Household and Water Taxes’
launched by a collection of such groups. The campaign had initial
success with 50% of eligible households boycotting the charge, but the
Inland Revenue received powers to withdraw the charge from welfare
payments and wages, thus nullifying the campaign. The Anglo ‘Not Our
Debt Campaign’ also gained momentum in 2012 and early 2013 as
public opposition grew to the annual repayment of €3.1bn of the €30bn
debt due in bondholders in lieu of the especially reckless actions of the
Anglo-Irish Bank.
The bailout agreement of 2010 between the Troika and the Irish
government included the introduction of household water charges and
the establishment of a new public utility, Irish Water. Irish Water was to
assume responsibility for all water and waste-water provision and dis-
posal, hitherto managed by local authorities and provided free at the
point of supply. Water charges and an associated household water
metering programme were implemented from January 2014. The pro-
jected average charge was €500 per household and €1200 for a
household with two adults and three children.
Within this context, the Irish water protest movement entered the
political stage as a focal point for anti-austerity opposition.
Undoubtedly the largest, broadest, and most sustained social movement
in Ireland since independence in 1921, the historical, social, cultural,
and political novelty and significance of this movement cannot be
overstated (Hearne, 2015). Coming six years into the austerity pro-
gramme, at a time when Ireland was exiting the Troika programme and
seemingly reaping the benefits of frugality, the water protests pro-
foundly shocked a complacent Irish political mainstream, which had
discounted and underestimated the devastating reality of the impacts of
austerity and an emerging grassroots rejection of the austerity regime.
4. Sartre, Butler, and a rendering of the Irish water wars
Our rendering of the water protest movement makes use of fresh
survey, interview, and participant engagement data – presented here as
a series of supporting vignettes1 (Fig. 1; see also Hearne, 2015). First,
we examine the causal status of scarcity in the constitution of 'serialised'
or 'inert' groupings on the one hand, and progressive anti-austerity
'groups in fusion' on the other, and argue that austerity produced in
Ireland a ‘milieu of scarcity’ which conspired to work the former into
the latter. Second we mobilise the concepts of the group-in-fusion, third
parties, and plural performativity to render intelligible the molecular
struggles rooted in privations in everyday life which coalesced into a
national protest movement. Third, we examine the claim that the water
1 In particular, we make use of a large scale online survey undertaken with
water protestors (‘the 2014 survey’), a series of email interviews with leading
coordinators of the movement and ongoing participant engagement. The online
survey was undertaken in December 2014 and generated 2556 responses from
citizens who had actively participated in water protests. The email interviews
were undertaken in May/June 2017 with twelve co-ordinators of the water
movement chosen to reflect the three pillars of the movement – smaller trade
unions, community activists and independent politicians. In addition, our
analysis is informed by participant engagement as a scholar activist by one of
the authors (Hearne) in national and local campaigns, the Right2Change policy
process, and media debate.
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movement was an effective group-in-fusion insofar as it usurped re-
presentative politics, but that the political mainstream has weathered
the storm and is presiding over a new period of neoliberalism redux.
4.1. To protest or not? Between seriality and fusion (2008 to 2014)
The people of Ireland were late in protesting austerity. Indeed, it
was only after six years of bank bailouts and welfare retrenchment and
after the country had exited the Troika bailout programme that an
impactful protest movement emerged. Of course the complicity of the
representative regime in the chosen recovery programme and the
failure of established Left to challenge this programme explains much of
this impasse. We might venture to read formal representative politics in
Ireland during this period as little more than a practico-inert deposit
from a prior dialectical cycle. A once vibrant group-in-fusion (perhaps
dating as far back as the establishment of the state) had degenerated
into a fossilised institution unable to apprehend, let alone represent, the
vital, lively will of the people. The movement emerged at the conclu-
sion of an earlier, circular, dialectical movement, as a sign perhaps that
seriality, especially in its new aggressive guise, would no longer be
countenanced.
But even in the absence of leadership from public representatives,
why were the Irish citizenry so immobilised? Sartre’s theorisation of the
interplay of scarcity, passivity, and protest provides one possible ex-
planation. Austerity created in Ireland a historically novel milieu of
scarcity in which resources became both rationed and distributed
unequally. For a while, communities jostled to minimise their exposure
to austerity measures; the public sector was pitted against the private
sector, urban communities against rural communities, education bud-
gets against health budgets, indigenes against migrants, employed
against the unemployed, the citizenry against bondholders, and devel-
opers against disadvantaged communities who were disproportionally
ravaged by austerity cuts to community services and social housing
budgets. Perhaps, from 2008 to 2014, scarcity overwhelmed sociality
and seriality triumphed over fusion. Mutual suspicion and antagonism
sabotaged collective empathy and solidarity. So long as the pain of
austerity is visited more upon others than upon me, I have little impetus
to protest.
But as austerity deepened and introduced intolerable scarcities and
precarities, vulnerability transformed into agency and seriality gave
way to processes of fusion and collective praxis. The new water charges
became a potent austerity measure to galvanise around towards the end
of the austerity programme when the cumulative weight of six years of
austerity had already been interiorised. The Water Services (No. 2) Bill
was then less an object of derision in itself and more a cause around
which multiple protest currents could rally; more a third party able to
collect a plurality of protests, furnishing them with a common foe. But
water proved to be an especially effective third party. Water charges
were applied universally and offended the entire populace. Water has
traditionally been provided free at the point of supply. Access to water
is viewed as a basic human right. And (at least untreated) water is a
ubiquitous resource in Ireland.
Fig. 1. Timeline: The Irish water wars.
Source: Authors own
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Vignette 1 – Resolving an impasse between seriality and
fusion? Water as a third party
In the 2014 survey (n= 2556), when asked why they were
protesting, participants cited objectives immediately related to
the imposition of water charges. 58.7% were concerned with
stopping future privatisation of water, 41.3% viewed access to
water as a fundamental human right, and 57.3% wished to see
the abolition of water charges, with only 3.5% campaigning to
reduce water charges. But protestors also harboured deeper
grievances: 59.6% demonstrated because ‘austerity had gone too
far’, and 42.9% in response to the bank bail-outs There was a
palpable sense of injustice that ‘ordinary’ Irish people have had
to pay, through austerity, for the bailing out of bondholders,
banks, and developers.Typical responses to an open question
probing motives for protesting were:
• ‘I will end up in arrears over water. I have no more money to give,
I'm on the brink. So rather than sit at home and give out about it,
I've decided to support the campaign’.
• ‘I'm trying to live on disability for multiple health problems and I
live alone so I have nobody to half the bills with’.
• ‘It’s just unfair and too much. I cannot see at the moment where the
money for water is going to come from in my already overstretched
budget. As a student and a single parent I find it difficult as it is to
make ends meet without having to face this also’.
• ‘My mother and her 75-year-old husband are homeless. My sister is
€8000 behind on her mortgage and banks are threatening to
repossess her apartment. My 65-year-old father has to use a food
bank and cannot afford to heat his house. We've had enough’.
• ‘I am a student with no help at all from the government, I'm already
working part-time during my Masters to be able to pay my rent and
food and I have a loan for my Masters fees, so I don't know how I
can pay more than that. And my rent keeps rising. STOP’.
• ‘Sick of a tax being added onto everything. We are at two-income
family with 3rd-level education, two good jobs, one child, another
on the way, and crèche fees higher than our mortgage. It's actually
getting to the point it's costing one of us to work, and we are on so-
called good wages. Every time we scrimp, they find something else
to chip away on us’.
4.2. Fusion, third parties, and performing popular sovereignty (2014–2016)
Primitive groups-in-fusion emerged in early 2014 through grass-
roots, neighbourhood, and community protests actively resisting in-
stallation of water meters outside of their homes. The water meter
protests initially emerged in, and spread throughout, working class
estates in Dublin and Cork, but quickly ignited in other regional towns
and villages. Whilst some of the protestors had participated in earlier
anti-austerity protests, notably a local Campaign Against Household
and Water Tax, few were members of any political party or experienced
campaigners. Unencumbered, uninhibited and inventive, these groups
devised ingenious schemes to resist water installations. Many were in-
spired by the ‘Ballyhea Says No campaign’ and assumed a similar label
(such as the ‘Dundalk Campaign Against Water, Household Tax and
Austerity’; ‘Ballyvolane Says No to Water Meters and Privatisation’;
‘Cobh Says No to Austerity’; ‘Waterford and South Kilkenny Say No to
Water Charges’; ‘Ballybeg Says No’; and ‘Lough Garman Against
Austerity’).
Vignette 2: The spatiality of primitive fusion in action –
protesting the installation of water meters
The strategy and action within the water protests contained a
strong spatial dimension that explains their origins and success.
The installation of domestic meters by private contractors
brought austerity visibly and directly into the intimate space of
the home. People gathered on the footpaths in the front of homes
where meters were being installed, using their bodies as a shield
to block access and stop installation. The resistance movement
grew across the estates as neighbours were inspired and
expressed solidarity with the resisters. An activist from ‘Cobh
Says No’ describes the imaginative spatial tactics communities
deployed:’
We ran it like a military operation I suppose, one of our members was
very good at strategy and he would say ‘we are going to do it like
this’. He would park his car, first thing in the morning, 6am, by the
entrance to the estate. Then he would relay a message of what was
coming in [from Irish Water to install meters] – how many vans, cars
trucks. He would text the message on to me and normally my role was
to be on the car following them (Irish Water) and have someone with
me to relay messages about where they were going. Then all the
residents had their own Facebook page, so the message would be
bounced around so it was an alert system that would allow us to be
up and ready to be there when they get in. Then at night we would
have street meetings in different areas. We would hold these meetings
and there was a real sense of community, of unity, of togetherness.
Some residents did want a meter – we had no problem with this. The
deal was that if four or five houses (on a street) wanted their meters –
they got it and there was no falling out. But for the residents that
didn't want a meter installed, which were the majority, we protected
them and they didn't get one’.
Throughout 2014, the grassroots direct action protests were suc-
cessful; only 880,000 (62%) of the planned 1.4 million meters were
ever installed. As civil disobedience spread across the country and be-
came more animated and confrontational, the Irish Gardai began to
make arrests at water meter installation sites. Whilst an effort was made
to conflate civil disobedience with public disorder, and to criminalise
some assemblies, the movement overall was recognised to be too vo-
latile and powerful for the political mainstream to control or ignore.
Furthermore, water protestors engaged in peaceful civil disobedience,
all too aware that violence would alienate necessary public support.
Still, on 30 September 2014, 12 protesters who had been blocking Irish
water workers from accessing a housing estate in North Dublin, were
arrested. Five protesters were sentenced in February 2015 for between
a month and two months for refusing to give an undertaking to stay
20m away from installations. Seven protestors (the ‘Jobstown 7’) were
arrested and charged with illegal detention (using kidnapping legisla-
tion) of a government Minister at a ‘sit-down’ water protest in
November 2015. In response to Gardai efforts to enforce orders to in-
stall meters, over 200 women silently protested outside Coolock Garda
Station in Dublin against Gardai tactics. Wearing pink ‘high-viz’ jackets
and holding candles, they would become known as the ‘pink ladies’
protestors.
Vignette 3: Performing protest or causing public disorder?
When leaving a conferring ceremony at An Cosán in Tallaght
Dublin on 15 November 2015, Labour Party TD, Tánaiste and
Minister for Social Protection, Joan Burton’s unmarked Gardai
saloon was surrounded by a large and angry crowd protesting
the imposition of water charges, accused in the media of
‘banging on the car and smashing the windscreen’, ‘throwing
missiles’, and ‘discharging a volley of verbal abuse’. A tense two-
hour stand-off stopped the car from leaving. Burton alleged that
Solidarity-People Before Profit TD, Paul Murphy had played an
active role in her detention. Eventually, surrounded by over 50
Gardai, the Minister was able to change vehicles and escape the
scene.
Subsequently, Gardai arrested 27 protestors and charged, in
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particular, TD Murphy, two South Dublin Councillors and four
others (the ‘Jobstown 7’) with the ‘false imprisonment’
(kidnapping) of TD Burton and her assistant. After a nine-week
trial between April and June 2017, a ‘not guilty’ jury verdict was
returned. A weakness for the prosecution was apparent conflicts
between statements made by Gardai and video evidence
captured on mobile devices by protestors and circulated widely
on social media. Three senior Gardai in particular claimed that
TD Murphy had asked the crowd, ‘will we let her go or will we
keep her all night?’ a claim he vehemently denied and which was
unsupported by recordings kept by protestors. At the conclusion
of the trial, the presiding judge instructed jurors to treat
carefully the ‘frail memories’ of some witnesses.
Irish Taoiseach Leo Varadkar reflected upon the significance of
the judge’s comments:
‘I would be very concerned if it is the case that we would ever have
Gardai on a stand in the court giving evidence that is not in line with
the facts, that is not in line with the video evidence and I think that
there is something there that needs to be looked at both by the Garda
Commissioner and senior Garda management. We need to be able to
trust that when the Gardai stand up in court and they say something
happened that it did happen and it shouldn't conflict with video
evidence and if it does then that is a problem.’
Claiming that access to water is a fundamental human right, a na-
tional ‘Right2Water’ campaign formed in September 2014 to harness,
coordinate, and scale the Irish water protests. Right2Water was estab-
lished by five smaller trade unions in alliance with the anti-austerity
Left political parties, and ‘non-aligned’ grassroots community water
groups. Whilst a variety of protest tactics were used, encouraged by the
effectiveness of direct protests against the installation of meters,
Right2Water recognised the symbolic power of people rising to occupy
community spaces in defiance of the state. In order to ‘scale-up’ the
power and determination of the local actions and thus show to the
political system the strength of the national movement, and to enable a
broad participation from across society, Right2Water organised na-
tional demonstrations. The first, in Dublin 11 October 2014, attracted
120,000 demonstrators. On November 1st 2014 100 separate demon-
strations were held in towns and cities across Ireland, involving over
150,000 participants. At least eight national water protest demonstra-
tions were subsequently been held, the last taking place in April 2017,
attracting approximately 20,000 demonstrators.
There was nothing inevitable about the scaling of atomised and
molecular grass roots protests into a national water protest movement.
It took many thousands of communities and individuals at various
scales to build local resistance into a quasi-coherent movement with
gravitas. While it remained an inchoate movement beyond the control
of any single group, the protest came to rely on the coordination of
three institutional pillars for direction: locally-based community
groups, small ‘third party’ trade unions, and oppositional anti-austerity
Left political parties and independent politicians. Not least because
these actors played a central role in the process of thirding a diverse
number of protests, populism expressed itself differently in Ireland than
elsewhere. An anarchic democratic Left ideology permeated the pro-
tests.
Perhaps most important were the five small trade unions that took
the decision to break from the ICTU’s passive acceptance of austerity,
and to embrace anti-austerity currents. Importantly, this third party
played a co-ordinating and mediating role, bringing (in the face of a lot
of challenges) and keeping together traditionally divided Left political
parties, winning the trust of sceptical community activists, and enga-
ging in a public media campaign that communicated the Right2Water
campaign as a broad-based, inclusive unifier. They organised in a way
that could involve and mobilise, not just the ‘usual suspects of left-wing
activists’, nor be restricted to those willing and able to resist meter
installation, but to the broader public exhausted with the austerity re-
gime. Furthermore, they provided an important progressive left popu-
list framing of the anti-austerity sentiment, articulating an inclusive
narrative, uniting all those opposed to austerity in solidarity (public and
private workers, poor and middle income, indigenous and migrant etc)
against the establishment and wealthy elite.
Insofar as they were able to perform popular sovereignty, in-
determinate public assemblies called into question the capacity of the
representative regime to serve the popular will. The powerful iconic
sight of tens of thousands of protestors occupying the streets of cities,
towns, and villages evidently shocked public representatives. As Butler
intimates, public assemblies signify even before they articulate a claim
and, in the Irish case, throngs of bodies, gathering and marching, ra-
pidly captured the attention of the political class, who read it as a signal
that they were now seriously out of touch with the people. Through the
performativity of national demonstrations, people expressed their de-
sire and hope for change through innovative slogans, hand painted
placards, banners and pageantry. The protests were lively, family-
friendly, and hopeful. They sustained the movement, empowered the
activists to keep going. At each large national demonstration thousands
realised they were not alone, not a small minority, and in this they
revealed to themselves and to the political establishment their strength
– their collective power (see Plate 1).
4.3. Popular sovereignty usurps representative democracy? (2016–present)
Opposition to water charges was a major issue in the 2014 local
elections. Anti-austerity left-wing political parties (particularly the left-
nationalist Sinn Fein, and the Trotskyist Anti-Austerity Alliance and
People Before Profit parties) and independent candidates gained
through their support of the water protests. Sinn Fein advocated for the
abolition of water charges, but wavered on calling for non-payment,
while the radical-left parties openly and actively advocated non-pay-
ment and ‘mass’ boycott of the charges. The establishment centre-right
parties of Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael received their lowest combined
vote in their history, while the Labour Party saw its support halved from
14% of the electorate to 7%.
Vignette 4: The representative regime in shock? Why the
outcome of the 2016 national election was entirely
predicable
In the 2014 survey (n=2556), 90.1% of respondents felt the
tactics (direct action in communities, street demonstrations,
marches) of the Right2Water movement were effective. 77.6%
stated the most effective way of getting change was through
citizen-led protests, followed by voting in elections (52.3%),
local community protests (40.8%), and contacting a political
representative (28%).
Nearly 45% of respondents said they voted for the main large
parties (Fianna Fáil/Fine Gael/Labour) in the 2011 election.
Over 70% of these respondents indicated they planned to change
their vote at the next general election. 65% of all respondents
stated that whomever they intended to vote for at the next
general election differed from whomever they voted for in 2011.
79.3% intended to vote for candidates affiliated to or endorsed
by the Right2Water campaign. 32% intended to vote for
candidates belonging to the People Before Power/Anti-Austerity
Alliance; 27% for Left independents; 24% for Sinn Fein; and only
6% for ‘Right’ Independents.
Despite the strong support for alternative Left parties, a large
proportion of the survey population (79%) wanted to see a new
political party formed with a platform of anti-austerity, anti-
corruption, anti-cronyism, radical political reform, and
democracy. An overwhelming majority of protestors believed
that it was time for a root and branch change in Irish political
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life. When asked what the single most important priority should
be for a new party (n= 1327), just over 50% identified equality,
followed by fairness (26%), political reform/democracy (17%),
standing up to Europe (12.7), fairer taxation (10%), and proper/
decent public services (8.5%). This result provides strong
indication of broad progressive Left sentiment amongst the water
movement.
In order to assuage protestors, the Fine Gael/Labour government un-
dertook a significant U-turn in November 2014, outlining plans to cap
water charges at €160 per single adult household and €260 for other
households until 2018, and to offer a water ‘conservation’ grant of €100
for all households. It also introduced legislation requiring a ‘plebiscite’
to be held if any future government wished to privatise Irish Water. Still,
after the first issuing of water bills in 2015 a majority of households
(56%) had not paid water charges. The highest level of payment was at
the third billing cycle in early 2016 when just 61% of the registered
1.522 million households paid the charges. In late 2016, that level fell
back and in the last billing cycle 73% of those subject to water charges
did not pay them.
Buoyed by this ‘success’, in August 2015 and in advance of the 2016
general election, Right2Water established Right2Change, a political
movement which sought ‘a fairer, more equal Ireland that benefits all of
the people rather than a select few’. Right2Change was based on ten
progressive policy principles developed participatorily by community
groups, activists, small trade unions, and political independents; its
objective to challenge the hegemony of Ireland’s two centre-right par-
ties. Right2Change convinced 100 candidates from the anti-austerity
Left parties and independents to enter a voting transfer pact. In the
February 2016 general election, 19% of first preference votes and 36
out of 158 seats in the national parliament were won by politicians who
had signed up to the Right2Change pact, while a further 99 TDs were
elected who had opposed water charges. Sinn Fein increased their
support from 9.9% to 13.8% and number of seats from 14 to 23. The
Anti-Austerity Alliance/People Before Profit parties increased their
presence from 4 to 6 seats. The establishment parties (Fianna Fáil, Fine
Gael, and Labour) received their lowest combined support in the history
of the state. The Labour Party vote collapsed from 19.4% to 6.6% and
the party dropped from 37 seats to 7 (see Fig. 2).
After the election, water charges became a central issue in
negotiations led by Fine-Gael to form a minority coalition government.
Eventually, a historic ‘partnership’ agreement was reached with Fianna
Fáil, on condition that Fine Gael suspend domestic water charges. As a
result, charges were suspended for nine months from July 2016 until 31
March 2017. In May 2017, the planned water charges regime was
abolished entirely and the majority of households will not now pay for
water. The principle that domestic water services should be funded
through general taxation and government investment has been ac-
cepted, and the metering programme has been stopped. People who
paid water charges will get refunds and a referendum enshrining public
ownership of water and water services has been promised.
Whilst it has undoubtedly been shaken to the core, there is a sense
that representative politics has weathered the storm and resistance has
ebbed, diffused, and dissipated. There has emerged no larger third to
totalise the water protest movement further, and mechanisms of fusion
appear to have reduced significantly. The impetus behind the
Right2Change movement has stalled, although a ‘Another Ireland is
Possible’ conference was held in November 2017 by Right2Change,
with over 300 water activists registering with the intent of continuing
the movement. And as they turn to confront a pressing housing crisis,
protestors are finding it difficult to replicate the success of the cam-
paign against water charges, the dramatic Apollo House occupation
aside. Ireland’s two Right-of-centre political parties may have lost a
share of the popular vote but they still remain dominant. Protest has
failed to bequeath a new or rejuvenated broad Left political party or
formation capable of challenging the hegemony enjoyed by the Right. It
might be that, with economic growth and some fiscal relief, anti-es-
tablishment politics will run its course and ebb, returning to its 20th
century long-run pattern of an ineffectual low.
5. Conclusion
This paper is offered as a contribution to existing human geo-
graphical scholarship on social movements, and in particular growing
literature on anti-austerity protests in Europe’s peripheral post-crash
recessionary states. It has ventured an interpretation of the origins,
meaning and implications of anti-austerity protests in the Irish
Republic, focussing specifically upon the country’s water wars.
What sense is to be made of the Irish case? To address this question
Fig. 2. Election results in Ireland 2007, 2011, 2016 (in bold ruling party or coalition).
Source: CSO, Ireland
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we have sought to supplement existing intellectual resources by ex-
ploring the nexus of scarcity, alienation, and anarchic protest found in
Jean-Paul Sartre’s Critique of Dialectical Reason, and the relationship
between precarity, public assembly, and popular sovereignty envisaged
in Judith Butler‘s Notes Toward a Performative Theory of Assembly. Our
central conclusion is that in many ways Ireland’s water protest move-
ment embodied the highest ideals of the Sartrean fused group. Certainly
it revealed the strengths and limitations of Sartrean hope. It is everyday
encounters with scarcity and atomised struggle with privation Sartre
claims, that birth groups in fusion, the motor force of history. Through
public assembly Butler argues, protests perform popular sovereignty
and place in doubt the authority of representative politics; here the
Sartrean group in fusion secures its potency. But groups in fusion, Sartre
warns, inevitably ossify into oppressive institutions. Sartre’s warning is
especially prophetic given the proclivity of the politics of the left be-
hinds to become a politics of retrenchment and exclusion, and the
disposition of some Right and Left populisms to degenerate into crip-
pling bureaucracies, nationalist spasms, and even pre-Fascist frater-
nities. What makes the Irish case fascinating and worthy of scrutiny is
the fact that protest never ossified and totalised into an oppressive or
regressive form of fraternity terrorism.
When set into international relief, it is clear that Ireland’s protests
betrayed a number of unique characteristics which enabled them to
retain their plasticity, elasticity, and indeterminacy. First, protests were
not orchestrated by established actors and infact owe their existence to
a vacuum left by the mainstream centre-right’s incorporation of the
formal political machinery into the austerity programme and the in-
action and impotence of the traditional activist base. Secondly, central
to the Irish story is the ways in which everyday encounters with aus-
terity stimulated a new tradition of autonomous and dispersed ‘first
time’ grass roots activist and community led protests. Third, the Irish
protests erupted late in the day, in part because the uneven distribution
of precarity and scarcity sabotaged the capacity of community groups
to unite and promoted seriality over sociality; in the end it took the
universal problem of water charges to trigger collective action.
Fourthly, community groups, small trade unions, and minority anti-
austerity political parties and independents acted as third parties and
gathered tributaries of protest but they were never willing or able to
achieve anything other than a light incubation of group praxis. Fifthly,
atomised protests agglomerated and scaled into powerful currents of
protest in part through the spatial practice of public assembly which
always remained in flux and beyond the control of any organising
constituency; indeed they were progenitors of novelty and emergence.
Finally, we have shown that protest exacted a heavy if in the end short
lived toll on the political establishment, causing panic over the latter’s
right to custody over democracy. It was success which sustained belief
that the anarchic formula was working.
Whilst not drifting into a fossilised bureaucracy or oppressive fra-
ternity, arguably Ireland’s Right2Change movement is evaporating
without a lasting legacy. Neoliberalism redux implies that Ireland’s
moment of fusion is petrifying and that seriality is once again tri-
umphing over mutuality and reciprocity. As the excitement of the
protest ebbs, the country is yielding to a new passive submissiveness, a
new plurality of solitudes. But the reassertion of neoliberalism is an
active and contingent accomplishment and remains vulnerable as a
politico-institutional project over the longue durée. There will be no
easy reassertion of Celtic Tiger 2.0. A watchful eye on the unfolding of a
dialectic between seriality and fusion in Ireland is merited. In a second
Irish Republic, the key question will be, if not the neoliberal juggernaut
then what? (Murphy, 2016). And to the extent that Ireland can provide
a compelling alternative, its politico-institutional future might carry
lessons for the wider transmogrification and eclipsing of the neoliberal
order. Through the water movement, Ireland birthed a historically
novel and entirely unexpected group-in-fusion, energising a species of
Left populism which may in time prove to have constituted the first
stirrings of a new social democratic project.
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